Misaligned Hope and Conviction in Health Care
by Steve Clarke, Justin Oakley, Jonathan Pugh, Dominic Wilkinson
First published: 16 November 2024
The workshop was based on work by
Professor Stephen Clarke (Professor of Philosophy at Charles Sturt University, Australia) and colleagues at Oxford and Monash University. Steve discussed his work in a roundtable with
Associate Professor Mehrunisha Suleman (Ethox Centre, Oxford) and
Professor Joshua Hordern (Faculty of Theology, Oxford). An article based on this work has now been published in the journal
Bioethics. Here are the details
Please follow the link to the original article
Abstract
It is often said that it is important for patients to possess hope that their treatment will be successful. We agree, but a widely appealed to type of hope—hope based on conviction (religious or otherwise), renders this assertion problematic. If conviction‐based hope influences patient decisions to undergo medical procedures, then questions are raised about the scope of patient autonomy. Libertarians permit patients to make decisions to undergo medical procedures on the basis of any considerations, including conviction‐ based hopes, on grounds of respect for freedom of choice. Rational interventionists want to restrict choices made on the basis of conviction‐based hope on the grounds that choices based on hope incorporate irrationality of a sort incompatible with autonomous decision making. In this article, we navigate a middle path between these extremes, arguing that patient decision‐making based on conviction‐based hope ought to be acceptable and permitted in health care when it conforms to norms of practical rationality.
These norms allow patients some room to make decisions to consent to undergo medical procedures informed by conviction‐based hope.
K E Y W O R D S
autonomy, conviction, decision‐making capacity, health care, hope, practical rationality
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